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No more than three million of Shanghai's six million people actually take part, directly and indirectly, in productive work. ... We should, first of all, mobilize a great number of refugees and unemployed masses to return to the countryside to areas flooded by the Yellow River in northern Anhui and salt-producing areas in northern Jiangsu. And we should persuade (shuofu) all refugee landlords, as well as those landlords and rich peasants deceived by the enemy to come to Shanghai, as well as peasants and youths forced by the enemy to migrate to Shanghai, to return to their respective places of origin to participate in production ... We should encourage, whenever possible and necessary, certain schools and factories to move inland so as to have convenient access to food, coal and raw materials.
In the early 1950s administrators in Shanghai and other major cities urged millions of refugees and unemployed urban workers and family members to go (or return) to the countryside.13 Rao's particular targeting of landlords and rich peasants for repatriation to the countryside, from where many had fled land reform, is one of the earliest indications of the intertwining of issues of population control and class struggle. His report also called for the transfer of major Shanghai industry to inland locations in smaller cities and rural areas, a strategy that would be pursued over subsequent decades.
Rao made explicit several important principles and perspectives that would eventually be incorporated in the hukou system. First was the distinction between producers and consumers, that is between productive and unproductive persons. Not only were homemakers and dependents denied recognition as productive persons, but even employees in the service, commercial and financial sectors were frequently classified as unproductive. Secondly, he made clear the state's intention to transfer industry and personnel to conform with planning criteria, including the transfer of industry and schools away from major metropolitan areas. Thirdly, it was the state's prerogative to return migrants to their native places. And finally, there was the view that Shanghai was overpopulated. At this time, state policies emphasized voluntary programmes, persuasion and the provision of positive incentives to achieve population relocation. But the intention to restrict the population of major cities and conduct large-scale repatriation to the countryside as a solution to problems of unemployment and hunger was already clear. Other major cities adopted similar approaches to population transfer. Government provided material and administrative support for migrants to the rural areas. The Beijing municipal government and the Suiyuan and Chahaer provincial governments established resettlement offices, reserved land and housing for migrants, and arranged credit in kind for settlers in frontier areas. By spring ploughing in 1950, People's Daily reported that 4,700 people (1,200 households) had left Beijing for Suiyuan, and 2,400 (620 households) had moved to Chahaer. In addition, 340 workers and their families went from Beijing to Benxi, an industrial city in Liaoning province. Tianjin provided passage for 1,741 people to go to Chahaer,'4 and returned to their homes 22,000 students and landlords who had fled the north-east."5 Shenyang relocated over 3,300 people in Liaoning and elsewhere in the north-east."6 These were undoubtedly a small part of those sent out or assisted in resettling in smaller cities and villages.
There were two basic reasons why many people accepted relocation and why resettlement processes were accomplished smoothly in the early years of the People's Republic. First, relocation was basically voluntary with the important exception of criminals and class enemies. In most cases, it was accomplished without coercion and frequently state financial support facilitated the process. Compulsory relocation was reserved for cases of "ideological re-education" and "questionable elements," especially former Kuomintang officials and landlords who had fled to the cities during the civil war or land reform. General Yao Ziyu, secretary of the Kuomintang commander Fu Zuoyi, who led the uprising and peaceful liberation of Beijing, subsequently recalled that during the "campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries" (1949-52), which coincided with the relocation project, hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang party members and soldiers were gaoled and some were executed. Others felt relief at having escaped punishment. On 16 July 1951, the Ministry of Public Security, with State Council Approval, issued "Regulations Governing the Urban Population."21 "The present regulations," it began, "were formulated with a view to maintaining social peace and order, safeguarding the people's security and protecting their freedom of residence and of movement." This document may in fact be said to have formally initiated the process which, in the course of a decade, effectively denied the Chinese people freedom of residence and movement, placing decisions in this realm in the hands of the state. It divided urban households into six categories with regulations governing each: residential households, industrial and commercial households, public residents (living in hotels, inns etc.), floating households (living in boats and ships), temple households, and aliens (foreign residents). Article 5 stipulated that "all those who move should first notify the local public security organ of change of residence, cancel the census record of the former abode, and apply for a change-of-residence permit." Similarly, after any move, people were required to "report to the local public security organ to enter their names in the census record within three days of arrival. When available, a change-of-residence permit should be submitted; if not, other relevant documents should be submitted instead."22
For the first time, a nation-wide mechanism was established to monitor urban population movement and residence, both long and short-term. For example, visitors of three days or longer were required to register with a public security sub-station (article 6), and hospital and hotel residents were similarly registered (article 7). Significantly, responsibility for registration and control were vested in the public security bureau. Nevertheless, with the exception of those under police investigation, almost anyone who applied for a permit to move could obtain it and then register anywhere, including Beijing and Shanghai.
For most people, the new system simply recorded changes from one residence to another. Like contemporary Japan's koseki system of neighbourhood registration, and like comparable systems in Taiwan Urban and industrial development and the progress of national construction will absorb the necessary rural labour, but this must be done gradually, and cannot be accomplished all at once. It is therefore necessary to prevail upon the peasants and check their blind desire to flow into the cities (quanzu nongmin buyao mangmu jincheng).
Like many other contemporary documents, it presented registration and control as short-term measures required to address imbalances whose long-term solution lay in industrialization and national construction. This document made distinctions that would soon become absolute between urban and rural residence and between those entitled to urban and rural employment. But it did not establish mechanisms to control or halt the "blind flow" of population.
In the early 1950s the state took vigorous steps to address problems of urban unemployment, including welfare for urban citizens and repatriation of unemployed rural migrants. Throughout the People's Republic, however, policy-makers have consistently assumed both that the countryside could absorb virtually unlimited supplies of labour, and that feeding the rural population was the responsibility of each locality. The administrative and welfare responsibilities of the state would in essence be confined to the small minority of the population living in urban areas. One reason for this hypersensitivity to urban problems is the fact that the new state accepted more or less axiomatically from the start (presumably derived from Soviet practice) a responsibility that no previous Chinese state had ever assumed: to provide jobs and subsidized food and housing for all urban residents.
For three decades from the early 1950s, China's cities were largely free of the telltale signs of urban poverty characteristic of cities in both core and peripheral regions from Calcutta to Rio to Los Angeles, including squatter settlements, armies of beggars and the chronic unemployed. China had by no means solved the poverty problem, though many foreign visitors mistakenly concluded this from the absence of squatter housing and beggars in the 1960s and 1970s. It had, however, eliminated the most visible manifestations of poverty in urban areas by a combination of employment and welfare measures for urban residents and controls that restricted the size of the urban population and even sought to reverse the flow from countryside to city. By contrast, the countryside was repeatedly forced to absorb virtually unlimited supplies of labour and even to accept and feed urban emigrants in time of famine. This policy of discarding the surplus or unemployable urban population in the rural periphery, in the absence of unemployment insurance or any national welfare programme extending to the countryside, reduced the financial responsibilities of the state and shifted the burden of feeding and employing repatriated people from the state to rural society. The result was the creation of a dual society with state resources channelled primarily to the cities at the same time that substantial portions of the rural surplus were transferred to urban industry, the military and other state priority projects.
Throughout The number is so small, but only they have a future. All other classes are transitional classes. ... The peasants in the future will become mechanized and will be transformed into agricultural workers. ... Right now there is the system of ownership by peasant co-operatives. In the future, in a few decades, they will be changed to be like factories; they will become agricultural factories. In this factory, you plant maize, millet, rice, sweet potatoes, peanuts and soybeans. As for the bourgeoisie ... they too will become workers. The several hundred million peasants and handicraft workers have now already become collective farmers; in the future they will become state farmers, agricultural workers using machinery.
For Mao, the congruence of ownership changes together with mechanization and industrialization would produce the merging of social classes, including the working class, the peasantry and the bourgeoise, into a single industrial working class. In fact state policies, of which the hukou system was the keystone, deepened the divide between city and countryside and between worker and farmer, and in numerous ways prevented or slowed the anticipated homogenization above all by freezing rural residents in their villages and denying them access to urban and industrial employment. effectively brought all industry and virtually all commerce within the orbit of state control.28
Initiation of the Hukou
In short, the transformation from private and capitalist ownership to state and collective ownership of agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce was basically completed in the years 1953-56. Parallel with and integral to ownership transformation and the extension of the planned economy, the state established mechanisms to control population movement, particularly to bind peasants to their collective-village, and to regulate and restrict entry to the cities. These population control mechanisms, whose importance has largely been overlooked in the literatures focusing on collectivization, nationalization and development, shaped China's countryside from the mid-1950s forward. They defined important parameters of an urban-rural divide that has controlled opportunity and mobility to the detriment of villagers ever since.
China's urban population increased from 10.6 per cent of total population in 1949 to 14.6 per cent in 1956, with a net gain of 34.6 million. Rural migrants accounted for 19.8 million of the total increase.29 In the first half of the 1950s, the most powerful stimulus for migration lay in the "pull" of the cities, above all the attraction of urban employment that offered workers security, a range of benefits and prestige. Yet there were also "push" factors. These included flight from poorer regions, discontent with co-operatives, and the loss of income-earning opportunities associated with the market as the state curtailed private commerce, set low purchasing prices for agricultural commodities, restricted and then largely eliminated opportunities for rural people to obtain seasonal or long-term work in the cities, and centralized agricultural processing in metropolitan areas.
State policies governing the cities and urbanization were an essential part of the First Five-Year Plan's approach to industrialization. The key was 18 cities designated as focal points for China's heavy industrial drive. China's leaders sought to decentralize the existing economic and population concentration in a handful of large coastal cities. As the state, partly for security reasons, limited growth in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin and other large coastal cities, inland key-point cities, many of them of small and medium size, became the focus for rapid growth through building complete sets of industry. Each such city was to receive 11 or more above-norm industrial projects, with Xian in the north-west designated to receive 42 projects.30 On 17 April 1953, the State Council promulgated a "Directive on Dissuading Peasants from Blind Influx into Cities," referring above all to the largest cities. The directive, using persuasive language, urged the hundreds of thousands of peasants who had entered the cities in search of work to return to their villages, exempting those who had already obtained employment and had govern- Mangliu, a reverse homophone for liumang, meaning hooligan, established a negative association with rural migrants. The state proclaimed that all subsequent population and labour flows from the countryside to the cities would be determined by fiat. "If in the future additional workers are needed for urban construction, the district and township government will be officially directed to recruit rural labour in a planned and organized manner." That is, rural recruits would presumably return to the countryside at the conclusion of their employment.
Villagers customarily obtained critical supplements to agricultural income by going to the city in slack seasons or for longer periods to find factory or construction work or to peddle. Survival strategies, moreover, dictated that some family members leave home to find work for years at a time in cities or other localities with superior job opportunities. In Raoyang county in southern Hebei, for instance, in the early 1950s roughly one fourth of rural adult males worked in the cities during the winter months and many more left the locality for years at a time. In 1954, as the state moved toward control of labour, private markets and grain, rural cadres were directed to keep farmers in the village and to use locally available corv6e labour to promote soil improvement, water conservancy and other capital construction projects to occupy villagers during the slack season.
The 1954 population directive curbed rural-urban movement through three different channels: it prohibited urban units from making private arrangements to recruit rural workers; it directed local governments to halt unco-ordinated recruitment in the villages; and it ordered managers and union leaders to instruct workers not to invite people from their villages to come to the cities in search of work. Off-farm slack season job opportunities grew scarce, as did full-time industrial jobs in most cities.
The state subsequently attempted to cut off all non-official recruitment channels. Urban labour departments allocated jobs to relevant county and township governments according to state plan. Local governments in turn allocated recruitment quotas to (predominantly suburban) villages where local cadres made the selection. Opportunities for urban and state sector employment for residents of more distant villages disappeared. Between 1953 and 1955, the state took control over urban food rations. In December 1953, "unified purchase and marketing of grain" had established compulsory sales to the state of specified amounts of grain at low state prices. The dual purpose was to assure ample low-priced food for urban residents and to channel the agricultural surplus from the countryside towards industry and the cities. "Unified purchase and marketing" was quickly extended from grain to cotton and oil crops, and within two to three years to all major foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials.
In August 1955, two months after establishing the hukou system, the State Council's "Provisional Measures Governing Grain-Rationing in Cities and Towns" established "provisional" rationing. The ration system, soon extended from grain to most other foods as well as to cotton and cloth, would continue basically unchanged for more than three decades. One result was to increase the difficulty that illegal migrants faced in obtaining food. Rationing was an integral part of the institutional order of which hukou was the centrepiece, together with transport controls, rural collectives and programmes to transfer people from city to countryside.
The complexity of China's rationing system after 1955 illustrates the minute gradations established by the hukou order. Persons registered in each household were classified according to categories by resident committees, resident teams, schools and work units. Name lists, together with hukou cards, were sent to the local government to verify and issue 39. Worker's Daily, 4 January 1958.
40. There was no unified policy regarding ticket purchase for public transport (train, bus and boat) prior to 1960. Subsequently, ticket purchasers were required to show official travel certificates before purchasing tickets, especially if the destination was Beijing and the time was politically sensitive.
41. With completion of the nationalization of private industry and commerce in 1956, most privately owned real estate, including rented housing, was also placed underjoint state-private management. Under this arrangement, all rented housing was handed over to state housing offices which took charge of rent collecting as well as repairs and maintenance. Although there was no pass system at that time, staying temporarily with relatives in a city required applying to the police for a permit, and staying in hotels required an official certificate. grain-supply cards (article 5). Seven categories of cards differentiated residence, occupation and grade: city and town resident grain-supply card; industrial and commercial trade grain-supply card; city and town animal feed-supply card; city and town resident grain-transfer card; grain ticket for nation-wide use; local area grain card; and local area animal-feed card (article 4). 42 Urban residents were entitled to present grain-supply cards to their local grain store to draw local or nation-wide grain tickets as appropriate within the limits of their specified ration. Villages who planned to travel had to bring their own grain to state grain stations where they could exchange it for grain tickets. Purchase of cooked rice, noodles, vermicelli and other grain-based foods in restaurants required presentation of grain tickets plus payment (article 7).43 Any change in family membership as a result of marriage, birth, death, separation, school, job change, migration etc., required presentation of hukou cards to arrange for additions, reductions or transfers in grain supply (article 8). In this way, registration was intimately tied to food access through rationing.
From 1955 food rationing in both city and countryside was an important corollary of the hukou system in state efforts to control population movement and to assure the supply of grain and other crops to priority sectors, specifically to the growing ranks of the industrial working class, the cities and the military. In that year rationing was used as a means to reduce grain consumption while assuring equity among units and individuals." Nevertheless, until 1959 rationing was implemented rather flexibly. In most areas one could still purchase grain in free markets at prices slightly higher than those in state stores.
Rationing sharply differentiated urban and rural residents. While the subsistence of urban residents was guaranteed by the state, rural residents were responsible for feeding themselves, except in time of especially severe famine when the state provided emergency relief. In this, as in many other ways, ranging from retirement to health care to education to subsidized housing, the state assumed responsibility for the livelihood of urban workers, particularly state sector employees, while enjoining rural people to practise collective self reliance. To encourage urban state sector workers to keep their families in the countryside, on 16 November 1957 the state inaugurated a system of annual leave for workers and cadres. "Provisional Regulations Governing Home Leaves and Wages of Workers and Employees" guaranteed every worker or staff member living apart from his or her father, mother or spouse an annual two to three week leave at state expense to return home to visit his or her family, the length depending on the time required for the journey. Where both spouses worked and lived apart from the native place, one was eligible to take home leave each year. Minister of Labour Ma Wenrui estimated that six million of China's 24 million state sector workers and employees lived at a distance from parents, spouse or both.52 The promulgation of home leave regulations preceded a campaign to pressure family members who had come to the city to return to the countryside. However, the heart of the problem -the large and growing gap between urban income and benefits and rural deprivation -remained The hukou system from its inception not only sharply distinguished urban and rural position and status but also differentiated the very basis for recording residence in city and countryside. In both instances, the unit of record shifted from that of the family (jia) to a unit defined by the workplace and by spatial factors rather than by kinship relations as in the former baojia. The 1958 regulations specify that in cities, public security organs will keep a register of each household, whereas in the countryside, the co-operative (collective, usually the brigade) maintains a single register with the names of all households and individuals. In other words, a separate record is kept for each urban household, while rural households were simply recorded as part of the larger village collective. The regulations explicitly linked hukou status with collective membership for rural residents. Article 4 stated that "in the countryside, a household (registration) book shall be issued to each collective," constituting the basis for a proof of "the identity of citizens." Collective membership became the basis for rural registration. To refuse to join the collective was to place oneself beyond the boundaries of state recognition since the law specified that non-member households could not register.
But what is a household? The case of a husband and wife living and working in two different cities, in a city and a village, or in two different villages illustrates the fact that it is the danwei or work unit and not the family that defines the household. In such cases, separate hukou is required, with children normally registered with their mother, the partner overwhelmingly more likely to occupy a lower rank in the hukou scale. The system normally allowed people to move down the status ladder, for example from Shanghai to a smaller city or the countryside, but not up. In the case of rural families who live or work in a single production team, their records are part of the larger production unit, and the household, not the individual, is the relevant income pooling unit with income paid to the household head.
The 1958 law changed the procedure for rural-urban migration. In the absence of a certificate of urban employment or school admission, it was necessary to obtain a moving-in certificate (zhun qian zhen) issued by the police in the city of destination before moving. With this, one could apply for a permit to move out (qian yi zhen) from the police station in one's original residence and complete hukou transfer (article 10). Most people had previously experienced no difficulty in obtaining a permit to leave, but subsequently, local authorities would not permit rural residents to leave without a certificate from the urban authorities approving the move. The change increased the difficulty for villagers seeking to move to the city.
Many who succeeded in entering cities also found their positions increasingly precarious. A Shanxi provincial official described the expulsion of tens of thousands of villagers who had "irrationally" entered the provincial capital Taiyuan, whose 1957 population had risen from 270,000 to 1.1 million in just seven years. Many workers' family members had no need to come to the cities, he explained, because they had work and housing in the villages, whereas in the cities they became non-productive dependents. Neither employment hopes nor the desire to unite families constituted acceptable reasons for migration. The state would "wipe out this 'family chaos'," not only by reducing the rate of population increase in Taiyuan, but by reducing the population by 100,000 through ejecting "non-productive elements" who lacked proper registration.57
Did "downward transfer." Most accepted promises that they would be rehired as soon as the economy improved. The vast majority of those who lost industrial jobs and the privileges associated with urban residence found it impossible ever again to return to urban jobs and homes. The hukou system provided the institutional core of the system of permanent rural exile that left people no alternative to living out their lives in the villages to which they were transferred in the early 1960s and barred villagers from migrating to the cities.
Conclusion
The three interdependent and interrelated functions of the hukou system that took full effect in 1960 constituted something quite new in China's history and in the annals of state socialist societies. The system fixed people permanently in place on the basis of their birthplace or, in the case of women, their husband's residence. In the years following the administrative collapse of the years 1958-60, the state exercised tight control over the urban-rural divide and within the hierarchy of urban places, barring all but rare officially-sanctioned transfers from countryside to cities, especially to large cities.
After 1960 formal state approval, rarely granted, was also required for intra-urban migration involving movement up the scale in the urban hierarchy. Residence became associated with sharply differentiated structures of socio-economic benefits, separating city from countryside. The Chinese state established two hierarchies for income, housing, grain rations, education, medical and other services, education, employment and retirement. In every sphere the city was privileged over the countryside, and state sector workers over collective farmers. The state reserved its resources disproportionately for those classified as urban residents.65 Moreover, within both urban and rural spheres there was further differentiation. For example, in the case of the cities, official regulations differentiated down to the percentage of fine grain (rice or wheat) in the diet, to the advantage of residents in large central cities over smaller cities and the countryside. In this system the rural collective population, fixed firmly at the bottom of the hukou hierarchy, bore the brunt of state policies. The distinction was reinforced by the systematic transfer of the rural surplus to industry and the cities, and the fact that state welfare benefits were reserved exclusively for urban dwellers and state sector workers.
The hukou system, implemented by stages in the course of the 1950s, and vigorously enforced with the full power of the state in the wake of the Great Leap famine in the decades after 1960, was and remains the institutional guardian of the deep urban-rural divide that has characterized China since the mid-1950s. With growing urban-rural inequality of 65. We distinguish here the collective from the state proper. We see the collective (at brigade and team levels) as a servant of the state, but the collective and its officials stand outside the system of state-ranked and salaried officialdom. Collective officials occupy, in short, a position between villagers and state officials, occupying positions of power and authority, but rarely rising beyond their native villages and depending for their income on village resources. income, subsidies and welfare benefits throughout the first three decades of the People's Republic, population registration and control mechanisms and the attendant food rationing and housing and school controls, the state was able to prevent the rapid urban migration found in many industrializing countries in recent decades. Throughout the collective era, the hukou system made it possible to bind China's rural population in a subaltern position on land it did not own and could not leave. Following the death of Mao Zedong, the great wall between city and countryside could no longer be maintained in its previous form. Since the 1980s, population movement between countryside and city has accelerated and a more flexible hukou policy has been adopted. The system nevertheless continues to differentiate opportunity structures for the entire population on the basis of position within a clearly defined, if once again partially permeable, spatial hierarchy.
